

INTERNATIONAL TRADE - ECON 245

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INCREASING RETURNS

INTRODUCTION

- ▶ Models on international trade so far all about:
 - ▶ **Interindustry** trade, e.g., Ricardo's wine versus cloth
 - ▶ Trade between **dissimilar** economies, e.g., in terms of factor endowments
- ▶ Two important unexplained regularities:
 - ▶ Large amount of **intraindustry** trade, e.g., within consumer goods
 - ▶ Large amount of trade among similar economies

INTRODUCTION

- ▶ Armington model did not **explain** these regularities: just re-produced them
- ▶ Also: so far CRS+perfect competition. What happens if we relax this?

- ▶ **Krugman (1980):**
 - ▶ Combines increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition
 - ▶ Provides theoretical justification for intraindustry and similar-country trade

MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION+INCREASING RETURNS

- ▶ Monopolistic Competition
 - ▶ MP is tractable form of imperfect competition *without* strategic interaction
 - ▶ But as with monopoly: firms face downward sloping demand curves
- ▶ Increasing Returns:
 - ▶ Fixed cost of production: in equilibrium only one firm produces each variety
 - ▶ There are profits - where do they go?
 - ▶ They are spent on fixed costs
 - ▶ Other profits competed away by free entry of *other* varieties

KRUGMAN (1980): SETUP WITH ONE COUNTRY

▶ Firms:

- ▶ Endogenous mass ("number") Ω of firms
- ▶ Firms pay fixed cost of entry f^e denominated in terms of domestic labor
- ▶ Each firm produces a unique variety of a differentiated product
- ▶ Each firm has same productivity and produces with labor only

▶ Consumers/Workers:

- ▶ CES preferences + L workers supplying one unit of labor inelastically

KRUGMAN (1980): PREFERENCES

- ▶ Krugman re-writes the representative consumer's utility function as follow:

$$U = \left(\int_{\Omega} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- ▶ As in Armington we assume $\sigma > 1$.

- ▶ **Note:**

- ▶ Diminishing marginal utility of consumption to extra units of each good
- ▶ Love for variety - adding varieties has no DRS. In symmetric equilibrium

$$U = \Omega^{(\sigma)/(\sigma-1)} q$$

KRUGMAN (1980): FIRMS

- ▶ The problem of a firm is given as follows

$$\max_{\{p(\omega)\}} p(\omega)q(\omega) - \frac{w}{z}q(\omega) - wf^e$$

where demand for each variety, $q(\omega)$, sloped downward in price

- ▶ First order condition with respect to $p(\omega)$:

$$q(\omega) + \left[p(\omega) - \frac{w}{z} \right] \frac{\partial q(\omega)}{\partial p(\omega)} = 0$$

KRUGMAN (1980): FIRMS

- ▶ General definition of elasticity of demand wrt price:

$$\epsilon(\omega) = - \frac{p(\omega)}{q(\omega)} \frac{\partial q(\omega)}{\partial p(\omega)} > 0$$

- ▶ Using this, rewrite the first order expression for optimal pricing rule:

$$p(\omega) = \frac{\epsilon(\omega)}{\epsilon(\omega) - 1} \frac{w}{z}$$

- ▶ In equilibrium prices are mark-up over marginal cost
- ▶ Size of markup depends on elasticity of demand

KRUGMAN (1980): CONSUMER OPTIMIZATION

- ▶ We already solved the consumer problem last time. Recall:

$$q(\omega) = p(\omega)^{-\sigma} X P^{\sigma-1}$$

- ▶ Assuming each variety accounts for little of aggregate spending:

$$\frac{\partial q(\omega)}{\partial p(\omega)} = -\sigma p(\omega)^{-\sigma-1} X P^{\sigma-1}$$

- ▶ Use both of these:

$$\epsilon(\omega) = -\frac{p(\omega)}{q(\omega)} \frac{\partial q(\omega)}{\partial p(\omega)} = \frac{p(\omega)}{p(\omega)^{-\sigma} X P^{\sigma-1}} \sigma p(\omega)^{-\sigma-1} X P^{\sigma-1} = \sigma$$

KRUGMAN (1980): EQUILIBRIUM PRICES

- ▶ Plugging in the elasticity of demand from consumer optimization into the firm pricing rule gives the monopolistic competition price:

$$p = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{z}$$

- ▶ With CES preferences: price is **constant** markup over marginal cost
- ▶ Equilibrium is **symmetric** so consumption of individual good:

$$c(\omega) = c = \frac{w}{\Omega p}$$

KRUGMAN (1980): EQUILIBRIUM QUANTITIES

- ▶ Free entry assumption implies firms enter until profits are zero:

$$\pi = p(\omega)q(\omega) - \frac{w}{z}q(\omega) - wf^e = 0$$

- ▶ Plugging in equilibrium prices and imposing symmetry ($q(\omega) = q$) yields:

$$q = (\sigma - 1)zf^e$$

- ▶ The quantity produced is just a function of parameters!
- ▶ What does this imply for the effect of trade?

KRUGMAN (1980): EQUILIBRIUM NUMBER OF FIRMS

- ▶ Equilibrium number of varieties produced is determined by labor market clearing:

$$L = \int_{\omega} l(\omega) d\omega = \Omega(q/z + f^e) \Rightarrow \Omega = \frac{L}{\sigma f^e}$$

- ▶ Without loss of generality we can normalize the price to 1, so that all endogenous variables are pinned down.

KRUGMAN (1980): EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- ▶ Suppose we add a symmetric second economy with which trade is free
- ▶ Since economies are identical wages, prices, number of firms will be the same in both
- ▶ Equilibrium consumption of each variety however is different:

$$c = c^{\star} = \frac{w}{p(\Omega + \Omega^{\star})}$$

KRUGMAN (1980): EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

- ▶ Gains from trade: consumers have access to a greater variety of goods and representative consumer's utility is increasing in the # of varieties consumed
- ▶ Trade is intra-industry
- ▶ Direction of trade is indeterminate
- ▶ Volume of trade: value of imports in home country (simple gravity eq!)

$$M = \frac{\Omega^*}{(\Omega + \Omega^*)} = (1 - \lambda)Lw$$

where λ is the "home share" of production.

QUESTIONS

- ▶ What would have happened with constant elasticity and perfect competition?
 - ▶ IRS+MP together *explain* what we see in the world
 - ▶ CRS long criticizes as highly unrealistic, IRS crucial force in the world!
- ▶ Of course, regions within the US are like “similar” countries doing intraindustry trade
- ▶ IRS likely plays a crucial role in ICT-enabled services
 - ▶ Much more work needed

SCALE AND TRADE

INTRODUCTION

- ▶ So far increasing returns were a crucial as a motive for trade with symmetric countries
 - ▶ However, there were no “scale effects” from trade: idea that increase in market allows some firms to “exploit scale better”
- ▶ The reason is our constant elasticity assumption. Suppose instead:

$$U = \int_{\Omega} v(c(\omega)) d\omega$$

where $v(\cdot)$ is increasing in its argument and concave

ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION

- ▶ Firm side is as before, so firm pricing rule is unchanged:

$$p(\omega) = \frac{\epsilon(\omega)}{\epsilon(\omega) - 1} \frac{w}{z}$$

- ▶ Derive general elasticity of substitution:

$$v'(c(\omega)) = \lambda p(\omega)$$

- ▶ Effect of a price change, assuming no effect on λ :

$$v'' dc(\omega) = dp(\omega) \lambda \Rightarrow \frac{dc(\omega)}{dp(\omega)} = \frac{\lambda}{v''} < 0$$

ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION

- ▶ So the elasticity of demand is now:

$$\epsilon(\omega) = - \frac{p(\omega) \partial q(\omega)}{q(\omega) \partial p(\omega)} = - \frac{v'c(\omega)}{v''} > 0$$

- ▶ We now this is positive from assumptions on $v(\cdot)$.
 - ▶ But don't know whether this is increasing or decreasing in $c(\omega)$
 - ▶ This is crucial and we assume

$$\frac{d\epsilon(\omega)}{dc(\omega)} < 0$$

- ▶ So as we move up the demand curve the elasticity rises

ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION

- ▶ Free entry is as before (Zero Profits)

$$\pi = p(\omega)q(\omega) - \frac{w}{z}q(\omega) - wf^e = 0 \Rightarrow p/w = 1/z + f/l(Lc(\omega))$$

- ▶ Also the firm pricing equation (profit maximization)

$$p/w = \epsilon(\omega)/(\epsilon(\omega) - 1)1/z$$

- ▶ Note that $\epsilon(\omega)$ is only a function of $c(\omega)$ so that equilibrium pinned down by p/w and c
- ▶ Once we have solved for p/w and c , we can then solve for the mass of firms from labor market clearing:

$$L = \int_{\omega} l(\omega)d\omega = \Omega(Lc(\omega)/z + f^e) \Rightarrow \Omega = \frac{L}{(Lc(\omega)/z + f^e)}$$

THE EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE

- ▶ Now suppose adding a second identical country with which trade is free
 - ▶ This is exactly like keeping a single economy but doubling L . So we analyze that instead.
 - ▶ Graph zero profit eq ($p/w = 1/z + f/(Lc(\omega))$) and price setting ($p/w = \epsilon(\omega)/(\epsilon(\omega) - 1)1/z$) with p/w on the y-axis and $c(\omega)$ on the x-axis.
 - ▶ A doubling in L shifts zero profit curve down: so c falls and p/w falls.
- ▶ Does not change firm pricing equation, only free entry adjusts
 - ▶ [AS BEFORE] Total product variety increases, so utility increases
 - ▶ [NEW!] Equilibrium consumption of each variety falls: consume less of each variety, raising elasticity of demand [since it is no longer constant], lowering markups and hence price, increasing welfare.
 - ▶ [NEW!] Firms increase scale, which lowers average costs, hence price [Can see this since number of firms in each country now falls! (see next slide)]

FIRM SELECTION

- ▶ Contrary to before, the number of varieties produced within each country now **falls** when open to trade
- ▶ We saw that p/w falls so revenue falls or costs increase: so it is less profitable to run a firm which must mean that fewer firms enter and so Ω decreases.
- ▶ Can also see this since p/w falls firms must move down their average cost curves, so q increases. But then Ω in each country (holding L fixed) must decrease from:

$$\Omega = \frac{L}{(q/z + f^e)}$$

- ▶ There is “selection”, prices fall as firms move down average cost curves: surviving firms increase output, sell less per person but to more consumers

TRANSPORT COSTS

REINTRODUCE ICEBERG TRADE COST - WHAT CHANGES?

- ▶ Iceberg trade costs: for one unit to arrive in destination, need to ship τ units.
- ▶ Price of foreign variety in home country:

$$p^* = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{z} \tau$$

- ▶ Define as ζ demand of home residence for foreign relative to domestic variety

$$\zeta = \frac{\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{\tau w^*}{z^*}\right)^{-\sigma} X P^{\sigma-1}}{\left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{w}{z}\right)^{-\sigma} X P^{\sigma-1}} = \frac{\left(\frac{w^* \tau}{z^*}\right)^{-\sigma}}{\left(\frac{w}{z}\right)^{-\sigma}}$$

REINTRODUCE ICEBERG TRADE COST – WHAT CHANGES?

- ▶ Home consumers' budget constraint implies that their expenditure equals their income:

$$(\Omega p + \zeta \Omega^* p)d = w$$

where d is the consumption of a representative domestic variety.

- ▶ Since elasticity of demand remains the same, pricing rules of firms remain the same.
- ▶ Since pricing is the same, free entry is the same so Ω and Ω^* are unchanged

REINTRODUCE ICEBERG TRADE COST - WHAT CHANGES?

- ▶ Introducing transport costs *does* have implications for relative wage
- ▶ If $L > L^*$ then home will have higher wage:
 - ▶ Large market advantage when production is subject to economies of scale **and** world markets are segregated by transport costs
- ▶ Gives rise to notion of **market access** [indexing shipment origin i , destination j]

$$p_i q_i = \sum_j \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} p_i^{1-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} E_j \Leftrightarrow p_i^\sigma = \frac{1}{q_i} \sum_j \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} P_j^{\sigma-1} E_j \equiv \frac{1}{q_i} MA_i$$

So wage in i increasing in "Market Access" (MA) since $p_i = \sigma/(\sigma - 1)w_i/z_i \propto w_i$

HOME MARKET EFFECT

INTRODUCTION

- ▶ With increasing returns to scale (IRS) **and** transport costs: locations export the good they have large local demand for
 - ▶ This is called the home market effect
 - ▶ Can think of it as sectoral specialization
- ▶ *Intuition:* IRS imply firms wish to concentrate production, transport cost imply this is optimally done close to large markets.
- ▶ Krugman developed this as an argument for agglomeration more general

INTRODUCING TWO SECTORS AND TYPES OF CONSUMERS

- ▶ Need a two sector version of above model.
- ▶ There are two industries, A and B, and within each industry there are many different varieties.
- ▶ Demand for each industries comes from separate local populations L_A and L_B :
$$U_A = \left(\int_{\Omega_A} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \quad U_B = \left(\int_{\Omega_B} q(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$
- ▶ Each type of worker can *work* in any industry and supplies 1 unit inelastically.
- ▶ Production technologies in both industries identical and as before.

EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TRADE

- ▶ Since consumers are identical within each group:

$$q_A = L_A c_A \quad q_B = L_B c_B$$

- ▶ Labor market clearing overall:

$$L = \int_{\omega \in \Omega_A} l(\omega) d\omega + \int_{\omega \in \Omega_B} l(\omega) d\omega = \Omega_A (q_A / z + f^e) + \Omega_B (q_B / z + f^e)$$

- ▶ Pricing rule of firms is the same as before
- ▶ Pricing rule+Free entry implies equilibrium output of each of the two types of varieties is the same as before

EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TRADE

- ▶ So we can determine $\Omega_A + \Omega_B$ from labor market clearing (previous slide)
- ▶ The size of each industry is determined by goods market clearing for each sector:

$$\Omega_A p q = w L_A \quad \Omega_B p q = w L_B$$

- ▶ But then:

$$\frac{\Omega_A}{\Omega_B} = \frac{L_A}{L_B}$$

- ▶ So we have solved for all endogenous objects of an individual country!

EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADE

- ▶ Assume the foreign country and home are mirror images:

$$L_A = L_B^* \quad L_B = L_A^*$$

- ▶ As a result equilibrium outcomes are the same except for the mass of type A and type B products produced.
- ▶ Home's share of expenditure on the home good is:

$$\lambda = \frac{\Omega_A p d}{(\Omega_A p + \zeta \Omega_A^* p^*) d} = \frac{\Omega_A}{\Omega_A + \zeta \Omega_A^*}$$

EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADE: LABOR MARKET CLEARING

- ▶ For *each industry* value of production in each country has to equal value of expenditure on the varieties produced in that country.
- ▶ In sector A, we hence need:

$$\Omega_A p_A q_A = \frac{\Omega_A}{\Omega_A + \zeta \Omega_A^*} w L_A + \frac{\zeta \Omega_A}{\zeta \Omega_A + \Omega_A^*} w^* L_A^*$$

$$\Omega_A^* p_A^* q_A^* = \frac{\Omega_A \zeta}{\Omega_A + \zeta \Omega_A^*} w L_A + \frac{\Omega_A}{\zeta \Omega_A + \Omega_A^*} w^* L_A^*$$

- ▶ Suppose that both countries are imperfectly specialized $\Omega_A, \Omega_B, \Omega_A^*, \Omega_B^* > 0$

EQUILIBRIUM WITH TRADE: LABOR MARKET CLEARING

- ▶ Divide through by Ω_A and Ω_A^* respectively and notice that $w = w^*$, $p_A = p_A^*$, and $q_A = q_A^*$:

$$\frac{L_A}{L_A^*} = \frac{\Omega_A + \zeta \Omega_A^*}{\zeta \Omega_A + \Omega_A^*} \Rightarrow \frac{\Omega_A}{\Omega_A^*} = \frac{\frac{L_A}{L_A^*} - \zeta}{1 - \zeta \frac{L_A}{L_A^*}}$$

- ▶ If $L_A = L_A^*$ then mass of size of industry A the same.
- ▶ For $\zeta < L_A/L_A^* < 1/\zeta$ (range of incomplete specialization), a rise in the relative size of L_A/L_A^* leads to a rise of home's share in the industry.
- ▶ So labor market clearing across countries pins down sector size now!

VOLUME AND PATTERN OF TRADE

- ▶ Home's *sectoral* trade balance for industry A:

$$T_A = \frac{\zeta\Omega_A}{\zeta\Omega_A + \Omega_A^*} wL_A^* - \frac{\zeta\Omega_A^*}{\Omega_A + \zeta\Omega_A^*} wL_A = \frac{\zeta wL_A^*}{\Omega_A\zeta + \Omega_A^*} [\Omega_A - \Omega_A^*]$$

- ▶ But we just showed that industry A is larger at home if it has a larger share of type A workers!
 - ▶ So home is a net exporter of industry A if it has a larger relative home market for industry A
- ▶ With transport cost and IRS: differences in demand matter for patterns of trade!
 - ▶ Increases in relative demand lead to more than proportionate increase in supply!

TAKE-AWAYS

- ▶ In Constant Returns to Scale world, increases in home demand lead either to proportional or less than proportional increase in local production
- ▶ The gravity equation is not a good test of IRS+transport cost since other models make this prediction.
 - ▶ Implications like scale effects on firm level or home market effect can be used to test increasing IRS+transport cost (see Davis Weinstein 1999, 2003)

GENERAL VERSION

KRUGMAN (1980): PREFERENCES

- ▶ Krugman re-writes the representative consumer's utility function as follow:

$$U_j = \left(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} a_{ij}(\omega)^{1/\sigma} q_{ij}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} = \left(\sum_{i \in S} \int_{\Omega_i} q_{ij}(\omega)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} d\omega \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

- ▶ We can use our previous results for demand

$$q_{ij}(\omega) = p_{ij}(\omega)^{-\sigma} X_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \quad \text{where} \quad P_j \equiv \left(\sum_{i \in S} \int_{\Omega_i} p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- ▶ ...and trade flows:

$$x_{ij}(\omega) = p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} X_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \quad X_{ij} = \int_{\Omega_i} x_{ij}(\omega) d\omega = X_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \int_{\Omega_i} p_{ij}(\omega)^{1-\sigma} d\omega$$

KRUGMAN (1980): FIRMS

- ▶ Firms in country i have the same productivity z_i and produce using labor only.

- ▶ The optimization problem faced by firm ω in country i is:

$$\max_{\{p_j(\omega)\}_j} \left(\sum_{j \in S} (p_j(\omega)q_j(\omega) - w_i \frac{\tau_{ij}}{z_i} q_j(\omega)) \right) - w_i f_i^e \text{ s.t. } q_j(\omega) = p_j(\omega)^{-\sigma} X_j P_j^{\sigma-1}$$

- ▶ Subbing in the constraint:

$$\max_{\{p_j(\omega)\}_j} \left(\sum_{j \in S} p_j(\omega)^{1-\sigma} X_j P_j^{\sigma-1} - w_i \frac{\tau_{ij}}{z_i} p_j(\omega)^{-\sigma} X_j P_j^{\sigma-1}(\omega) \right) - w_i f_i^e$$

- ▶ Constant marginal cost imply that can consider each destination a separate problem

KRUGMAN (1980): FIRMS

- ▶ Profit maximization implies the following optimal pricing:

$$p_{ij}(z_i) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \frac{\tau_{ij} w_i}{z_i}$$

- ▶ We can drop the ω since all firms in i make the same optimal decisions.
 - ▶ We carry the z_i for contrast with the heterogeneous firm case
 - ▶ In Melitz (2003) firms in country i will differ in their productivity

KRUGMAN (1980): GRAVITY

- ▶ We substitute the optimal pricing equation into the bilateral trade expression:

$$X_{ij} = X_j P_j^{\sigma-1} \int_{\Omega_i} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \frac{\tau_{ij} w_i}{z_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} d\omega = \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \tau_{ij}^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{w_i}{z_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} N_i X_j P_j^{\sigma-1}$$

- ▶ Where N_i is the measure of firms producing in country i
- ▶ Compare this to gravity equation in Armington model:
 - ▶ Additional term relating to markups: all else equal reduces trade
 - ▶ Additional term relating to number of firm: need additional eq. condition

KRUGMAN (1980): WELFARE

- ▶ With firm profits the real wage no longer equals welfare of consumers
 - ▶ Need an additional restriction: will assume free entry driving profits to zero
- ▶ Can derive an expression for real wages similar to Armington model:

$$\frac{w_j}{P_j} = \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}\right) N_j^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} z_j \lambda_{jj}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- ▶ Recall from Armington:

$$U_j = \frac{w_j}{P_j} = a_{jj}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} A_j \lambda_{jj}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} = A_j \lambda_{jj}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- ▶ Last equality because Krugman assumed $a_{ji} = 1 \forall j, i$

**NEW GAINS FROM
TRADE**

NEW SOURCES OF GAINS

- ▶ Get access to foreign varieties+love for varieties [Krugman with CES]
- ▶ Lower price from larger scale at home firms [Krugman without CES]
- ▶ Lower price from decrease in markup [Krugman without CES]
- ▶ Selection of better firms? [Not yet, all firms the same]
 - ▶ Melitz (2003) [his JMP!!!] which is up next